tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post4204136349427352915..comments2024-03-19T07:46:09.811-04:00Comments on Moneyness: Short Squeezes, Bank Runs, and Liquidity PremiumsJP Koninghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02559687323828006535noreply@blogger.comBlogger50125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-55771461016834344202021-01-31T22:52:21.554-05:002021-01-31T22:52:21.554-05:00Ahh so this is how to hurt hedgefundsAhh so this is how to hurt hedgefundsSeymour Clarvagenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-37142671347368393552014-04-14T16:39:19.633-04:002014-04-14T16:39:19.633-04:00Anonymous:
Suppose the Fed initially holds 20 oz ...Anonymous:<br /><br />Suppose the Fed initially holds 20 oz of silver as backing for $20 FRN's it has issued. The silver is both the backing and the deliverable. Of course convertibility might be delayed by a day, a year, or a century. Delays don't change anything important, except that interest becomes a bigger factor.<br />Next, let the fed issue another $80 FRN's in exchange for $80 worth of bonds (note: denominated in dollars, not ounces). The public now holds $100 of FRN's, which are still worth 1 oz. each. To see this, define E as the exchange value of the dollar (oz./$). Setting assets (20 oz + $80 worth of bonds worth E oz. each) equal to liabilities ($100 worth E oz. each) yields<br /><br />20+80E=100E<br /><br />or E=1 oz./$.<br /><br />Now suppose there is a 30% reduction in the public's desire to hold FRN's. Thirty FRN's pile up, unwanted, in private hands. The holders probably intend to present them to the Fed and demand 30 oz, but if the fed is smart, it will instead sell $30 of its bonds, thus soaking up the unwanted $30 of FRN's. No need for the fed to pay out the silver. The bonds serve as the deliverable. This makes sense, since those last $80 were created in exchange for bonds, they can of course be retired in exchange for those same bonds.<br /><br />Not sure about your point as to the fed being a private corporation. Legally yes, it is. But of course the Board of governors are government appointees. If the fed were combined with the treasury, then the $80 worth of bonds would appear on the liability side of the treasury's balance sheet, but would effectively be cancelled as the $80 FRN's were issued.<br /><br />Mike Sproulhttp://www.csun.edu/~hceco008/realbills.htmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-86521499888708000222014-04-14T16:19:51.659-04:002014-04-14T16:19:51.659-04:00Mike, long understood, but backing does not mean a...Mike, long understood, but backing does not mean a thing unless there is a deliverable. There's no arbitrage available, and so the point is moot. Without deliverables, there is no difference between your "backing" and a state of being "unbacked", and so is unfalsifiable. Why bother?<br /><br />Also, to answer, the Fed holds Treasury assets versus base money liabilities because the Fed is a private institution -- take a look at their annual report. The Fed has equity capital, full stop. <br /><br />stone, yes they created demand deposits, but former-bondholder wealth is net zero changed -- they sold their bond and got cash. Just a portfolio mix issue. Again, doesn't signify -- moot. <br /><br />The real power of the Fed is to dilute the means of account. Bank reserves are undtradable in the real economy, and so do not affect the MOA for the broad economy. <br /><br />The only other form of base money is currency. Dilute currency, and you've succeeded in diluting the MOA for broad NGDP.<br /><br />Neat stuff about cash optionality -- cash is a long put on assets, paid in inflation!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-49254789120579661812014-04-14T14:18:46.569-04:002014-04-14T14:18:46.569-04:00Thanks Mike. I think my own views are closer to t...Thanks Mike. I think my own views are closer to the Chartalist version, but I'm still thinking it over.Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-47137530790789178962014-04-14T13:45:58.657-04:002014-04-14T13:45:58.657-04:00Nick:
We need to distinguish two views:
1) The St...Nick: <br />We need to distinguish two views:<br />1) The State Theory or Chartalist view, which says that taxes (and legal tender laws) create a demand for money.<br />2) The backing theory, which says that taxes (or assets seized through legal tender laws) are an asset to the money issuer, and thus back the money in the same way that a firm's assets back the stocks and bonds it has issued.<br /><br />Here are some reasons I like the backing theory better:<br />1) it means money is valued for the same reason that that stocks, bonds, etc. are valued. There is no need for a "special" theory of money.<br />2) As rival moneys (foreign currency, checking accounts, credit cards) are issued, the Chartalist (=quantity theory) view implies that the resulting fall in the demand for base money will cause inflation. Not so for the backing theory. If 100 base dollars are backed by 100 oz worth of the issuer's assets, then $1=1 oz regardless of what rival moneys come along.<br /> Mike Sproulhttp://www.csun.edu/~hceco008/realbills.htmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-70875659889093606842014-04-14T05:36:40.912-04:002014-04-14T05:36:40.912-04:00Mike. I think you misunderstand me. The existenc...Mike. I think you misunderstand me. The existence of a debt owed to Walmart (representing all the debt to which legal tender applies), in addition to the ABC IOUs (representing currency), is essential to my point. I agree that if Walmart's net worth is simply $90 worth of silver and it has no financial claims, then the IOUs cannot be worth $100. But I also agree that, in a world where there were no debt, that legal tender laws might not be enough to give currency its value. My point depends on the assumption that there is a lot of pre-existing debt out there, because it's those debtors that generate the demand for the otherwise valueless currency.Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-62630087887005107772014-04-13T18:49:29.133-04:002014-04-13T18:49:29.133-04:00Nick:
Those were ABC's IOU's, not walmart...Nick:<br /><br />Those were ABC's IOU's, not walmart's. If walmart's net worth is just $90, and the government declares that walmart must accept all 100 of ABC's IOU's, then 100 of ABC's IOU's are backed by nothing but walmart's $90 net worth, and 1 ABC IOU=.9 oz.Mike Sproulhttp://www.csun.edu/~hceco008/realbills.htmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-43320509545169204402014-04-13T18:46:08.396-04:002014-04-13T18:46:08.396-04:00Stone:
If the money issuer holds 100 oz worth of ...Stone: <br />If the money issuer holds 100 oz worth of assets against $101, and if it pegs $1=1 oz, then the arbitragers would line up to get their 1 oz for $1, knowing that the first $100 in line would get 1 oz, and the last dollar would get nothing. People would also short the dollar against silver and profit as the dollar fell.<br /><br />If assets are denominated in the same currency that the bank issues, then there is a problem of inflationary feedback, where, for example, a drop in asset values will cause the dollar to fall, which causes assets values to fall more, etc. I discuss this in my paper entitled "The Law of Reflux"). The Law of Reflux also answers your question about M-pesas. As people stop using dollars, they would reflux to the Fed, first for the fed's bonds, and ultimately for the Fed's gold. If the Fed failed to buy back the refluxing dollars, then that is tantamount to a loss of backing and the dollar would lose value. But if the Fed buys the dollars back at par as they reflux, the value of the dollar is unaffected.<br />Mike Sproulhttp://www.csun.edu/~hceco008/realbills.htmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-62677825591306476322014-04-13T09:35:15.558-04:002014-04-13T09:35:15.558-04:00JP - maybe, but let me clarify. I don't think...JP - maybe, but let me clarify. I don't think that pointing to legal tender laws is sufficient to answer that question, because the relevance of those laws presupposes the existence of monetary debts. All I think legal tender laws do is ensure the quality of the central bank's money as a risk-free asset, whereas the quality of commercial bank money does indeed depend on its backing. This is part of what enables the central bank to exert its special influence over money. If I was giving my answer to the question of why people accept worthless bits of paper (in general as opposed to specifically the central bank's), legal tender laws would only figure incidentally.<br /><br />Also, I don't disagree that the existence of appropriate backing would be sufficient to make money acceptable; I'm just not convinced it is essential (although I'm still open on this).Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-56123498298849584592014-04-13T07:37:21.541-04:002014-04-13T07:37:21.541-04:00"I should clarify that I'm not offering a..."I should clarify that I'm not offering an alternative theory of money here..."<br /><br />Sure you are. It's a legitimate answer the question: "why do intrinsically useless/valueless pieces of paper circulate at a positive value?"... which is basically one of the biggest puzzles in monetary economics. Mike's backing theory is also a good answer.JP Koninghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02559687323828006535noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-26477971221296637372014-04-13T05:20:23.475-04:002014-04-13T05:20:23.475-04:00In the UK, the BoE's main asset by a long shot...In the UK, the BoE's main asset by a long shot is its loan to the APF. In theory (but probably not legally), it could distribute this in specie to the Government, but then the excess reserves could never get extinguished. If the APF sold off its bond holdings and repaid the loans, the government would just end up sitting on the reserves. It would all be very messy and unnecessary. It makes much more sense to run the BoE as a solvent entity. Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-25999882999591010182014-04-13T05:09:40.564-04:002014-04-13T05:09:40.564-04:00Nick, I guess in the days before QE, the central b...Nick, I guess in the days before QE, the central bank's holdings of assets allowed then to reel back in bank reserves by selling off assets to drain bank reserves as a way to increase interest rates whenever they wanted to. In the post-QE world where there is no scarcity of bank reserves perhaps it is just a historical legacy that that is the institutional structure?stonehttp://directeconomicdemocracy.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-34855505356283103962014-04-13T04:00:04.055-04:002014-04-13T04:00:04.055-04:00Mike - not convinced by that. Say Walmart's $...Mike - not convinced by that. Say Walmart's $90 net worth consists of a loan of $100 to me and loan of $10 from the bank. Then the 100 IOUs are worth $1 each. If I could buy them from someone else for $0.90, I would make a profit of $10, so I will pay anything up to $1 each for them. The same applies even if Walmart has negative net worth.<br /><br />Of course once all the debt the IOUs can be used for has been extinguished, they are worthless again, so an example with only Walmart and only a $100 loan is a bit misleading. In reality, the uses for legal tender are highly unlikely to ever be fully extinguished.<br /><br />JP - I should clarify that I'm not offering an alternative theory of money here - it just struck me that money subject to legal tender laws should retain its face value even if the issuing central bank had no assets.<br /><br />I think you mean that it would distribute out its assets if it didn't need them - selling them obviously wouldn't change its net worth. I don't know exactly why central banks don't do this, but in general I'd guess it's because they tend to be run as ordinary corporate entities that can normally only distribute out of post-tax profits. I'm not sure on this yet, but my feeling is that it has nothing to do with a need for backing.Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-28484214637620340322014-04-13T03:24:32.258-04:002014-04-13T03:24:32.258-04:00Mike Sproul, you say that if the dollar was at a v...Mike Sproul, you say that if the dollar was at a value in excess of the value of the backing held by the central bank, then "arbitragers would be all over it". What precisely do the arbitrageurs do? Do you mean a shift in exchange rates versus other currencies or a shift in the yields of the bonds held as backing by the central bank? It all seems very much muddied by the fact that the assets held as backing by the central bank are fixed interest securities denominated in the very same currency that comprises the central bank liabilities. <br />Perhaps stress testing the idea by setting out realistic scenarios where the USD lost all of its value would help to explain it all. I guess if people in America all started transacting in mpesa mobile phone money (as in Kenya http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-Pesa ), M-Pesa had a floating exchange rate with the USD, all new private debts and wage contracts etc were denominated in M-Pesa, and the government only accepted taxes in M-Pesa, then the USD value would slide to zero. The fed would still be holding trillions of dollars worth of dollar denominated treasury bonds and MBS as backing for the currency but trillions of dollars would not buy you anything anymore. I guess it is a classic currency substitution hyperinflation scenario.<br />I suppose that Hyman Minsky quote "everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted" is the key point. Successful currencies need to have all angles covered so as to ensure that they continue to be accepted. I also think a lot of it is probably down to trust in convention. Orphan currencies, shell money and I guess a large part of gold's value are driven by convention. There is a heck of a lot of gold stockpiled, it would swamp the market for wedding rings for a long time if people stopped viewing it as a store of value and sold off that stockpile BUT enough people trust that everyone else will continue to want it for its store of value role so it has successfully served that role for a very long time and probably will continue to do so. stonehttp://directeconomicdemocracy.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-68498571696395241432014-04-12T21:17:56.630-04:002014-04-12T21:17:56.630-04:00I think that in theory both Nick's legal tende...I think that in theory both Nick's legal tender argument and Mike's backing argument are sufficient to give bits of paper a positive value.<br /><br />In practice, I think the fact that central banks do choose to hold assets rather than sell them off is evidence in favor of Mike's point. If they didn't need them, they'd have sold them decades ago. <br /><br />Also, legal tender laws are <a href="http://jpkoning.blogspot.ca/2013/01/legal-tender-101.html" rel="nofollow">far less draconian</a> than one would assume if the positive value of central bank money depended on them. Given their leniency, I can only assume these laws' monetary role isn't very big.JP Koninghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02559687323828006535noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-20678871813164530402014-04-12T17:47:36.484-04:002014-04-12T17:47:36.484-04:00Nick:
Start with the government declaring that ABC...Nick:<br />Start with the government declaring that ABC's IOU's must be accepted by walmart at face value. If walmart's net worth is only $90, then those 100 IOU's are worth $.90 each, since that's as much as the government could steal from walmart. Now suppose the government starts adding sears, kmart, etc. It's still the case that if the victims' assets total $90, then 1 IOU=$.90, but if those firms have net worth >$100, the IOU's will trade at par. This assumes that the government is physically able to steal from those firms. If it loses the ability to steal, then the IOU's will drop in value just like money issued by an insolvent bank.Mike Sproulhttp://www.csun.edu/~hceco008/realbills.htmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-13571205833261720532014-04-12T13:50:52.834-04:002014-04-12T13:50:52.834-04:00Not sure I follow this (specifically the legal ten...Not sure I follow this (specifically the legal tender point). Say Company ABC has made some disastrous business decisions and has no assets, but still has $100 of IOUs outstanding. These IOUs are clearly worth nothing. Now let's say the government passes a law (puts a gun to everyone's head?) that these IOUs will be legal tender and may be used to settle any debt at face value. The IOUs will now be worth $100 (whatever the real value of a $ is).<br /><br />So the holder of the IOUs is suddenly $100 better off. Who has this been "stolen" from? Economically it has been stolen from everyone else that holds $ denominated assets, although those that are indebted in $ actually benefit. But I'm struggling to see how the continued solvency of those rich in $ has a bearing on its value.<br />Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-24860703452249300252014-04-12T12:49:00.912-04:002014-04-12T12:49:00.912-04:00Stone and Nick:
If money acquired value because of...Stone and Nick:<br />If money acquired value because of the denomination of private debts, then we'd have a violation of the no free lunch principle. If the government has 100 oz worth of silver, bonds, etc, as backing for 100 of its IOU's ("dollars"), then $1=1 oz., and everything's fine. But if the government has issued $101, and assets are only 100 oz., and the value of the dollar somehow stayed at $1=1 oz, then arbitragers would be all over it. The first $100 to be redeemed at the bank would get paid 1 oz worth of stuff, while the last $1 in line would get nothing. Just as arbitrage assures that stocks and bonds trade at their backing value, it does the same for money. This result is not affected by the fact that some third parties might have issued some IOU's denominated in dollars. The government's assets back the government's money, and the third party's assets back the third party's money.<br /><br />About legal tender: That can mean that the government declares dollars to be legal tender in payment of taxes. That's ok, as it provides actual backing. The government can also hold a gun to walmart's head and tell the public that walmart will accept dollars as equivalent to 1 oz. This also provides backing, although the backing was stolen from walmart, and if walmart goes broke, the backing is lost and the dollar loses value. The backing theory works whether the backing was stolen from walmart, or from taxpayers.Mike Sproulhttp://www.csun.edu/~hceco008/realbills.htmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-84801865361978685812014-04-12T06:30:22.426-04:002014-04-12T06:30:22.426-04:00Maybe. But I wasn't saying legal tender laws ...Maybe. But I wasn't saying legal tender laws are all you need - just that I think they imply that the central bank doesn't need any backing assets.Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-22965113280567011482014-04-12T05:59:55.653-04:002014-04-12T05:59:55.653-04:00Nick Edmonds, is the issue that there is more to e...Nick Edmonds, is the issue that there is more to ensuring people denominate their debts in the government's money than simply legal tender laws? In many countries, foreign currency denominated debts are fairly normal. Many companies not in the US nevertheless have USD denominated corporate debt. Households in Hungary had Swiss Franc denominated home mortgages. Don't some UK hedgefunds etc have JPY denominated debts? The trick is for the government to ensure that enough private debts are denominated in their currency. Perhaps taxation and other "backing" are all part of that. I guess a lot of what the US military and CIA does is ensuring debts and contracts outside of the US are USD denominated for much the same reason.stonehttp://directeconomicdemocracy.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-72891935855394006852014-04-12T04:55:51.131-04:002014-04-12T04:55:51.131-04:00Concerning the role of private debts, if central b...Concerning the role of private debts, if central bank issued money is subject to legal tender laws, I'm not sure it requires any backing, even the taxing power of the government.<br /><br />Say I hold a bond issued by XYZ. Now if I issue a CLN (providing for physical delivery) where the underlying is the XYZ bond, the bond has effectively become a risk-free asset for me. I no longer care whether XYZ has any assets at all, because whatever the bond is worth, I can use it to settle my CLN.<br /><br />Legal tender laws effectively make all monetary debts CLNs for which the underlying is the currency. Whatever the true value of the currency, I can always use it to settle my debts. As long as there was debt (and in the real world, there is an awful lot of debt), currency would be valuable even if the central bank had no assets at all.<br />Nick Edmondshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15342983814699700396noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-40504816759573437442014-04-12T04:44:59.198-04:002014-04-12T04:44:59.198-04:00Mike Sproul, did you see the stuff about a facilit...Mike Sproul, did you see the stuff about a facility for fed "negative liabilities"? I thought it might be relevant for your theory.<br />http://macromoneymarkets.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/challenging-mmt-mr-notions-of-central.html?showComment=1395788287589#c2645615494398712861<br />“There’s actually a Fed accounting facility in place, ready to go, that will allow for temporary losses by creating “negative liabilities” instead of negative capital on the Fed’s balance sheet.”stonehttp://directeconomicdemocracy.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-85180526293332587352014-04-12T04:15:45.013-04:002014-04-12T04:15:45.013-04:00Mike Sproul, your inclusion of "taxes receiva...Mike Sproul, your inclusion of "taxes receivable" as a backing asset clears up everything for me as it brings tax token aspects of money fully into it,<br />These are some links about tax token money:<br />http://www.taxtoken.org/<br />http://www.ebay.ie/itm/South-Africa-Tax-Token-1912-EF-/141160227268<br />http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2007/06/why-does-fiat-money-seemingly-work.html (see section "Tally sticks and Charles II")<br />http://www.bus.lsu.edu/accounting/faculty/lcrumbley/tally%20stick%20article.pdf<br /><br />I also think that private debts denominated in the currency issued by the state monetary authority do a great deal to confer value to the state money. Basically the state just needs to ensure that the private sector uses state money as the unit of account and then private indebtedness does most of the heavy lifting of conferring value to the currency.stonehttp://directeconomicdemocracy.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-59830273376712239672014-04-12T03:39:28.031-04:002014-04-12T03:39:28.031-04:00Anonymous, you're saying that QE would be tota...Anonymous, you're saying that QE would be totally different if the bank reserves exchanged for the bonds purchased by the fed were held by the public rather than being held by banks. I think it is crucial to bear in mind that for QE although the fed buys the bonds from banks, most of those bonds were initially held by non-banks and then sold to the fed via a bank simply using the bank as a short term conduit for the sale. So the overall transaction is a non-bank getting bank deposits in exchange for bonds. eg see<br />http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q1prereleasemoneycreation.pdf<br /><br /> I also think the notion that it makes a big difference whether that money is bank deposits or paper folding money is mistaken. If an insurance company or family office or whatever has sold off millions of dollars worth of treasury bonds into the QE program (via a primary dealer bank) do you really think that they are going to have a different view of how to deal with that money depending of whether it is a bank deposit or a vault full of pallets of paper bills? Either way they are just going to see it as an account statement. I think the people selling bonds via QE largely hold cash for its "option quality".<br />There is something about why Warren Buffett holds cash for just that reason:<br />http://friedmaninvestmentgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/For-Warren-Buffett-the-cash-option-is-priceless.pdf<br /><br />“”He thinks of cash as a call option with no expiration date, an option on every asset class, with no strike price.” It is a pretty fundamental insight. Because once an investor looks at cash as an option – in essence, the price of being able to scoop up a bargain when it becomes available – it is less tempting to be bothered by the fact that in the short term, it earns almost nothing. Suddenly, an investor’s asset allocation decisions are not simply between earning nothing in cash and earning something in bonds or stocks. The key question becomes: How much can the cash earn if I have it when I need it to buy other assets that are cheap, versus the upfront cost of holding it? “There’s a perception that Buffett just likes cash and lets cash build up, but that optionality is actually pretty mathematically based, even if he does the math in his head, which he almost always does,””<br />stonehttp://directeconomicdemocracy.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6704573462403312459.post-48273769320972393082014-04-11T21:30:47.733-04:002014-04-11T21:30:47.733-04:00"This is also how fractional reserve banks op..."This is also how fractional reserve banks operate."<br /><br />Good point.<br /><br />Naked shorting gets unfairly maligned. Before banking arrived on the scene, gold coin would probably have carried a large liquidity premium. But if bankers could short gold without actually borrowing any coin (just by printing gold redeemable notes), they could issue exchange media that was competitive with coin. This would reduce the liquidity premium on gold to some lower level, thus providing society with more liquidity -- at less cost. <br /><br />Speculators who engage in naked shorting in the context of the stock market are doing the same. If a stock has a large liquidity premium, a broker who doesn't have any shares but sells them short is providing a socially useful service. By providing the market with more stock and stock IOUs, they'll diminish the liquidity premium on that stock and provide traders with more liquidity -- at a cheaper price. <br /><br />It's good when entrepreneurs find new ways to reduce the prices we have to pay for things like televisions, health care, and transportation. The same goes with liquidity. The more of it, and the cheaper, the better.JP Koninghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02559687323828006535noreply@blogger.com