Tuesday, December 17, 2024

After twelve years of writing about bitcoin, here's how my thinking has changed


What follows is an essay on how my thinking on bitcoin has changed since I began to write on the topic starting with my first post in October 2012. Since then I've written 109 posts on the Moneyness Blog that reference bitcoin, along with a few dozen articles at venues like CoinDesk, Breakermag, and elsewhere.

An early bitcoin optimist

I was excited by Bitcoin in the early days of my blog. The idea of a decentralized electronic payment system fascinated me. Here's an excerpt from my second post on the topic, Bitcoin (for monetary economists) - why bitcoin is great and why it's doomed, dated November 2012:

"Bitcoin is a revolutionary record-keeping system. It is incredibly fast, efficient, cheap, and safe. I can send my Bitcoin from Canada to someone in Africa, have the transaction verified and cleared in 10 minutes, and only pay a fee of a few cents. Doing the same through the SWIFT system would take days and require a $35 fee. If I were a banker, I'd be afraid." [link]

I was relatively open to Bitcoin for two reasons. First, I like to think in terms of moneyness, which means that everything is to some degree money-like, and so I welcome strange and alternative monies. "If you think of money as an adjective, then moneyness becomes the lens by which you view the problem. From this perspective, one might say that Bitcoin always was a money," I wrote in my very first post on bitcoin. Second, prior to 2012 I had read a fair amount of free banking literaturethe study of private moneyso I was already primed to be receptive to a stateless payments system, which is what Bitcoin's founder, Satoshi Nakamoto, originally meant his (or her) creation to be. 

A lot of bitcoin-curious, bitcoin-critics and bitcoin-converts were attracted to the comments section of my blog, and we had some great conversations over the years. My bitcoin posts invariably attracted more traffic than my non-bitcoin ones, all of us scrambling to understand what seemed to be a newly emerging monetary organism.

My early thoughts on the topic were informed by having bought a few bitcoins in 2012 for the sake of experimentation, some of my earlier blog posts describing how I had played around with them. In 2013 I wrote about the first crop of bitcoin-denominated securities market (which I dabbled in)predecessors to the ICO market of 2017. I also used my bitcoins to buy altcoins, including Litecoin, and in late 2013 wrote about my disastrous experience with Litecoin-denominated stock market speculation. In Long Chains of Monetary Barter I described using bitcoin as an exotic bridging currency for selling XRP, a new cryptocurrency that had just been airdropped into the world. I didn't notice it at the time, but in hindsight most of these were instances of bitcoin facilitating illegal activity, i.e. unregistered securities sales, which was an early use case for bitcoin.

Although Bitcoin excited me, I was also critical from the outset, and in later years my critical side would only grow, earning me a reputation among crypto fans as being a salty no-coiner. In a 2013 blog post I grumbled that playing around with my stash of bitcoins hadn't been "as exciting as I had anticipated." Unlike regular money, there just wasn't much to do with the stuff, my coins sitting there in my wallet "gathering electronic dust."

 "...the best speculative vehicles to hit the market since 1999 Internet stocks."

What my experimentation with bitcoin had taught me was that the main reason to hold "isn't because they make great exchange media—it's because they're the best speculative vehicles to hit the market since 1999 Internet stocks." But that wasn't what I was there for. What had tantalized me was Satoshi's vision of electronic cash, a revolutionary digital payments system. Not boring old speculation.

In addition to my practical complaints about bitcoin, I also had theoretical gripes with it. The "lethal" problem as I saw it back in my second post in 2012 is that "bitcoin has no intrinsic value." Over the next decade this lack of intrinsic value, or fundamental value, would underly most of my criticisms of the orange coin. Back in 2012, though, the main implication of bitcoin's lack of intrinsic value was the ease by which it might fall back to $0. As I put it in a 2013 article:

"Bitcoin is 100% moneyness. Whenever a liquidity crisis hits, the only way for the bitcoin market to accommodate everyone's demand to sell is for the price of bitcoin to hit zero—all out implosion" [link]

But if the price of bitcoin were to fall to zero then it would cease to operate as a monetary system, which would be a huge disappointment to those of us who were fascinated with Satoshi's electronic cash experiment. Adding to the danger was the influx of bitcoin lookalikes, or altcoins, like litecoin, namecoin, and sexcoin. In theory, the prices of bitcoin and its competitors could "quickly collapse in price" as arbitrageurs create new coins ad infinitum, I worried in 2012, eating away at bitcoin's premium. The alternative view, which I explored in a 2013 post entitled Milton Friedman and the mania in copy-paste cryptocoins,  was that "the earliest mover has superior features compared to late moving clones," including name brand and liquidity, and so its dominance was locked-in via network effects. Over time the latter view proved to be the correct one.

The "zero problem"

Despite my worries, I was optimistic about bitcoin, even helpful. One way to stop bitcoin from falling to zero might be a "plunge protection team," I offered in 2013, a group of avid bitcoin collectors that could anchor bitcoin's price and provide a degree of automatic stabilization. In a 2015 post entitled The zero problem, I suggested that bitcoin believers like Marc Andreessen should consider donating $21 million to a bitcoin stabilization fund, thus securing a price floor of $1 in perpetuity. 

No fan of credit cards, in a 2016 post Bitcoin, drowning in a sea of credit card rewards, I suggested that bitcoin activists encourage retailers that accept bitcoin payments to offer price discounts. This carrot would put bitcoin on an even playing field with credit card networks, which use incentives like reward points and cashback to block out competing payment systems.

My growing disillusionment

By 2014 or 2015, I no longer saw much hope for bitcoin as a mainstream payments system or generally-accepted medium-of-exchange. "For any medium of exchange to displace another as a means for buying stuff, users need come out ahead. And this isn't happening with bitcoin," I wrote in a 2015 post entitled Why bitcoin has failed to achieve liftoff as a medium of exchange, pointing to the many costs of making bitcoin payments, including commissions, setup costs, and the inconveniences of volatility.

In another 2015 post I focused specifically on the volatility problem, which stems from bitcoin's lack of intrinsic value. If an item has an unstable price, that militates against it becoming a widely used money. After all, the whole reason that people stockpile buffers of liquid instruments, or money, is that these buffers serve as a form of insurance against uncertainty. If an item's price isn't stable—which bitcoin isn't—it can't perform that role. 

Mind you, I did allow in another 2015 post, The dollarization of bitcoin, that bitcoin might continue as "an arcane niche payments system for a community of like minded consumers and retailers." I even tracked some of these arcane payments use cases, such a 2020 blog post on retailers of salvia divinorium (a legal drug in many U.S. states) falling back on bitcoin for payments after the credit card networks kicked them off, followed by a 2021 post on kratom sellers (a mostly-legal substance) doing the same. But let's face it, a niche payments system just wasn't as impressive as Satoshi's much broader vision of electronic cash that had beguiled me in 2012, when I had warned that "if I was a banker, I'd be afraid." 

The dollarization of bitcoin

By 2015 a lot of my pro-bitcoin blog commenters began to see me as a traitor. But I was just changing my thinking with the arrival of new data.

Searching for Bitcoin-inspired alternatives: Fedcoin and stablecoins

Bitcoin's deficiencies got me thinking very early on about how to create bitcoin-inspired alternatives. By late 2012 I was already thinking about stablecoins:

"What the bitcoin record-keeping mechanism needs is an already-valuable underlying asset to which it can be tethered. Rather than tracking, verifying, and recording the movement of intrinsically worthless 1s and 0s, it will track the movement of something valuable." [link]

Later, in 2013, I speculated about the emergence of "stable-value crypto-currency, not the sort that dangles and has a null value." These alternatives would "copy the best aspects" of bitcoin, like its speed and safety, but would be linked to "some intrinsically valuable item." A few months later I predicted that "Cryptocoin 2.0, or stable-value cryptocoins, is probably not too far away." This would eventually happen, but not for another few years.

My dissatisfaction with bitcoin led me to the idea of decentralized exchanges, or DEXs, in 2013, whereby equity markets would "adopt a bitcoin-style distributed ledger." That same year I imagined central banks adapting "bitcoin technology" to run its wholesale payments system in my post Why the Fed is more likely to adopt bitcoin technology than kill it off. In 2014 I developed this thought into the idea of Fedcoin, an early central bank digital currency, or CBDC, for retail users.

If not money, then what is bitcoin?

By 2017 or so, even the most ardent bitcoin advocates were being forced to acknowledge that Satoshi's electronic cash system was not panning out: the orange coin was nowhere near to becoming a popular medium-of-exchange. This was especially apparent thanks to a growing body of payments surveys (which I began to report on in 2020) showing that bitcoin users almost never used their bitcoins to make payments or transfers, preferring instead to hoard them. So the true believers pivoted and began to describe bitcoin as a store-of-value, or digital gold. It was a new narrative that glossed over Satoshi's dream of electronic cash while trying to salvage some monetary-ish parts of the story.

I thought this whole salvage operation was disingenuous. In 2017 I wrote about my dissatisfaction with the new store-of-value narrative, and followed that up with a criticism of the digital gold concept in Bitcoin Isn’t Digital Gold; It’s Digital Uselesstainium. (The idea that store-of-value is a unique property of money is silly, I wrote in 2020, and we should just chuck the concept altogether.)

But if bitcoin was never going to become a generally-accepted form of money, and it wasn't a store-of-value or digital gold, then what exactly was it? 

I didn't nail this down till a 2018 post entitled A Case for Bitcoin. We all thought at the outset that bitcoin was a monetary thingamajig. But we were wrong. Of the types of assets already in existence, bitcoin was not akin to gold, cash, or bank deposits. Rather, it was most similar to an age-old category of financial games and zero-sum bets that includes poker, lotteries, and roulette. The particular sub-branch of the financial game family that bitcoin belonged to was early-bird games, which contains pyramids, ponzis, and chain letters. Here is a taxonomy:

A taxonomy showing bitcoin as a member of the early-bird game family

Early-bird games like pyramids, ponzis, and chain letters are a type of zero-sum game in which early players win at the expense of latecomers, the bet being sustained over time by a constant stream of new entrants and ending when no additional players join. Pyramids and ponzis are almost always administered by thieves who abscond with the pot. Bitcoin, by contrast, was not a scheme nor a scam. And it was not run by a scammer. It was leaderless and spontaneous, an "honest" early-bird game that hewed to pre-set rules. Here is how I described it in a later post, Bitcoin as a Novel Financial Game:

"Bitcoin introduces some neat features to the financial-game space. Firstly, everyone in the world can play it (i.e., it is censorship-resistant). Secondly, the task of managing the game has been decentralized. Lastly, Bitcoin’s rules are automated by code and fully auditable." [link

This ponziness of bitcoin was actually a source of its strength, I suggested in 2023, because "it's tough to shut down a million imaginations." By contrast, if bitcoin had an underlying real anchor, like gold, then that would give authorities a toe hold for decommissioning it.

Bitcoin-as-game gave me more insight into why most bitcoin owners weren't using bitcoin as a medium-of-exchange. Its value as a zero-sum bet was overriding any functionality it had for making payments. In a 2018 post entitled Can Lottery Tickets Become Money?I worked this out more clearly:

"Like Jane's lottery ticket, a bitcoin owner's bitcoins aren't just bitcoins, they are a dream, a lambo, a ticket out of drudgery. Spending them at a retailer at mere market value would be a waste given their 'destiny' is to hit the moon." [link]

If bitcoins weren't like bank deposits or cash, how should we treat them from a personal finance perspective? Feel free to play bitcoin, I wrote in late 2018, but do so in moderation, just like you would if you went to Vegas. "Remember, it's just a game."

Bitcoin is innocuous, don't ban it

By 2020 or 2021, the commentary surrounding bitcoin seemed to be getting more polarized. As always there was a set of hardcore bitcoin zealots who thought bitcoin's destiny was to change the world, of which I had been a member for a brief time in 2012. But arrayed against them was a new group of strident opponents who though bitcoin was incredibly dangerous and were pushing to ban it.

A vandalized 'Bitcoin accepted' sign in my neighborhood

I was at odds with both sides. Each saw Bitcoin as transformative, one side for the good, the other for the bad. But I conceived of it as an innocuous gambling device, one that only seemed novel because it had been transplanted into a new kind of database technology, blockchains. We shouldn't ban bitcoin for the same reason that we've generally become more comfortable over the decades removing prohibitions on online gambling and sports betting. Better to bring these activities into the open and regulate them than leave them to exist in the shadows.

Thus began a series of relax-don't-ban-bitcoin posts. In 2022, I wrote that central bankers shouldn't be afraid that bitcoin might render them powerless. For the same reason that casinos and lotteries will ever be a credible threat to dollar's issued by the Fed or the Bank of Canada, neither will bitcoin.

Illicit usage of bitcoin was becoming an increasingly controversial subject. Just like casinos are used by money launderers, bitcoin had long become a popular tool for criminals, the most notorious of which were ransomware operators. My view was that we could use existing tools to deal with these bad actors. Instead of banning bitcoin to end the ransomware plague, for instance, I suggested in a 2021 article that we might embargo the payment of ransoms instead, thus choking off fuel to the ransomware fire. Alternatively, I argued in a later post that the U.S. could fight ransomware using an existing tool: Section 311 of the Patriot ActWhich is what eventually happened with Bitzlato and PM2BTC, two Russian exchanges popular with ransomware operators that were put on the Section 311 list.    

Nor should national security experts be afraid of enemy actors using bitcoin to evade sanctions, I wrote in 2019, since existing tools, in particular secondary sanctionsare capable of dealing with the threat. The failure of bitcoin to serve as an effective tool for funding the illegal Ottawa protests, which I documented in a March 2022 article, only underlined its low threat potential:

"Governments, whether they be democracies or dictatorships, are often fearful of crypto's censorship-resistance, leading to calls for bans. The lesson from the Ottawa trucker convoy and Russian ransomware gangs is that as long as the on-ramping and off-ramping process are regulated, these fears are overblown." [link]

Other calls to ban bitcoin were inspired by its voracious energy usage. In a 2021 blog post entitled The overconsumption theory of bitcoin, I attributed bitcoin's terrible energy footprint to market failure: end users of bitcoin don't directly pay for the huge amounts of electricity required to power their bets, so they overuse it. No need to ban bitcoin, though. The way to fix this particular market failure is to introduce a Pigouvian tax on buying and/or holding bitcoins, which I described more clearly in a 2021 blog post entitled A tax on proof of work and a 2022 article called Make bitcoin cheap again for cypherpunks! 

Lastly, whereas bitcoin's harshest critics have been advocating a "let it burn" policy approach to bitcoin and crypto more generally, which involved leaving gateways unregulated and thus toxic, I began to recommend regulating crypto exchanges under the same standards as equities exchanges in a 2021 article entitled Gary Gensler, You Should be Watching How Canada is Regulating Coinbase. Yes, regulation legitimizes a culture of gambling. But even Las Vegas has stringent regulations. A set of basic protections would reduce the odds of the betting public being hurt by fraudulent exchanges. FTX was a good test case. After the exchange collapsed, almost all FTX customers were stuck in limbo for years, but FTX Japan customers walked out unscathed thanks to Japan's regulatory framework, which I wrote about in a 2022 post Six reasons why FTX Japan survived while the rest of FTX burned.  

So when does bitcoin get dangerous?

What I've learnt after many years of writing about bitcoin is that it's a relatively innocuous phenomena, even pedestrian. When it does lead to bad outcomes, I've outlined how those can be handled with our existing tools. But here's what does have me worried. 

If you want to buy some bitcoins, go right ahead. We can even help by regulating the trading venues to make it safe. But don't force others to play.

Whoops, You Just Got Bitcoin’d! by Daniel Krawisz

Alas, that seems to be where we are headed. There is a growing effort to arm-twist the rest of society into joining in by having governments acquire bitcoins, in the U.S.'s case a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve. The U.S. government has never entered the World Series of Poker. Nor has it gone to Vegas to bet billions to tax payer funds on roulette or built a strategic Powerball ticket reserve, but it appears to be genuinely entertaining the idea of rolling the dice on Bitcoin.  

Bitcoin is an incredibly infectious early-bird game, one that after sixteen years continues to find a constant stream of new recruits. How contagious? I originally estimated in a 2022 post, Three potential paths for the price of bitcoin, that adoption wouldn't rise above 10%-15% of the global population, but I may have been underestimating its transmissibility. My worry is that calls for government support will only accelerate as more voters, government officials, and bureaucrats catch the orange coin mind virus and act on it. It begins with a small strategic reserve of a few billion dollars. It ends with the Department of Bitcoin Price Appreciation being allocated 50% of yearly tax revenues to make the number go up, to the detriment of infrastructure like roads, hospitals, and law enforcement. At that point we've entered a dystopia in which society rapidly deteriorates because we've all become obsessed on a bet.

Although I never wanted to ban Bitcoin, I can't help but wonder whether a prohibition wouldn't have been the better policy back in 2013 or 2014 given the new bitcoin-by-force path that advocates are pushing it towards. But it's probably too late for that; the coin is already out of the bag. All I can hope is that my long history of writing on the topic might persuade a few readers that forcing others to play the game you love is not fair game.

Friday, December 13, 2024

It's time to trash the "store of value" function of money

When we first learn about money and banking in high school or university, we are all taught that money has three functions: medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value. Maybe it’s time for educators to throw out this triumvirate. It’s not very accurate. 

We need a simple and teachable device to take the triumvirate’s place. I propose the money Venn diagram.


Before I explain the money Venn diagram, let’s revisit the textbook triumvirate.

When something is a medium of exchange, what is meant is that it is generally acceptable in trade. You can use it to buy stuff at the grocery store, or purchase stocks on the stock market, or get things online. 

The quality of being a medium of exchange is really more of a gradient than a matter of either/or. Banknotes, for instance, are good at brick and mortar shops, but useless online. Your debit card works great at shops, but forget trying to buy shares with it. But both are sufficiently widely accepted to qualify as a medium of exchange.

Because cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Litecoin aren’t widely accepted, they don’t make it across the line to qualify as a medium of exchange. Neither do Walmart or Target gift cards. Cigarettes don’t qualify either, but that wasn’t the case in 1950 when Milton Friedman used them to buy gas:

The unit of account function of money refers to the fact that our economic conversations and calculations are couched in terms of a given monetary unit, whether that be the $, ¥, or £. In Canada and the US, prices are expressed in grocery aisles with dollars, our salaries use dollar units, and our debts are denominated in dollars. We don’t express prices in terms of government bonds, or Microsoft shares, or cigarettes or bitcoins. These things don’t function as a unit of account.

Thirdly, when money acts as a store of value we mean that it preserves value over time and space. Whereas the first two functions are quite useful, the store of value isn’t. Every asset functions as a store of value: houses, diamonds, banknotes, deposits, bitcoins, LSD tabs, lentils, cars, spices. And so it is meaningless to cast store of value as a unique function of money. Monetary economists such as Nick Rowe and George Selgin have proposed, and I concur, that we just chuck store of value from the definition of money.

But we are still left with two useful definitions for money, unit of account and medium of exchange. Which gets us to the money circle.

Note that the two circles in the diagram, medium of exchange and unit of account, don’t perfectly overlap. About 99% of the time the things we use as media of exchange are also the things we use as a unit of account. So the contents of our wallets or our bank accounts, dollar banknotes and dollar deposits are functionally equivalent to the $ units displayed in signs in grocery aisles.

But for the remaining 1% of the time, the unit of account and medium of exchange are separated. The idea of a separation is tough to get one’s head around. Luckily we’ve got a nice example. In Chile the prices of many things, particularly real estate, are expressed in terms of the Unidad de Fomento. But no Unidad de Fomento notes or coins circulate in Chile. It is a purely abstract unit of account.

Apartments for sale in Chile, priced in Unidad de Fomento

If a Chilean wants to buy an apartment that is priced at 840 Unidad de Fomento, she must use a separate medium of exchange, the Chilean peso, to make the payment. The peso is issued by Chile’s central bank, the Banco Central de Chile, in both paper and account form.

How many pesos must she pay? Every day the Banco Central de Chile publishes the exchange rate between the Unidad de Fomento and the peso. Right now one Unidad de Fomento is equal to 28,969 pesos. If an apartment were priced at 840 Unidad de Fomento, a Chilean would have to hand over 24 million Chilean pesos today.

Why has Chile separated its unit of account from its medium of exchange? I have discussed the issue at length. But the short answer is that it was a trick the government used to help cope with high inflation in the 1960s. Chilean inflation has been well under control for decades now. The practice of using the Unidad de Fomento as a unit-of-account has continued nonetheless.

You can see why it’s rare for these two functions to be separated. It’s awkward to do conversions every time one wants to pay for something. For the sake of ease, we tend to evolve towards systems where the medium of exchange and unit of account are united. But these exceptions are still important enough that we need a Venn diagram.

To sum up, money isn’t best thought of as a medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value. Let’s just think of it as just a medium of exchange and a unit of account. For the most part these circles overlap, and the two functions are united. But this isn’t always the case. 

[My article was originally published at AIER's Sound Money Project in 2020 under the title A Simpler and More Accurate Way to Teach Money to Students]

Thursday, December 5, 2024

Tornado Cash un-OFAC'ed


The next chapter in the Tornado Cash saga just dropped. Last week a court ruled last that Tornado Cash, a bot that can be used for obfuscating crypto, is safe from being sanctioned.

I first wrote about Tornado Cash in 2021, before its legal troubles began, warning of the risks ahead. I've been tracking Tornado's legal saga since then. (See here | here | here ). The saga serves as a bellwether for how financial services hosted on blockchains are to be sliced and diced under existing laws, in particular the crucial anti-money laundering statutes and sanctions laws. More generally it foreshadows how autonomous techno-beings, many of which don't yet exist, are to be treated by the law.

In the newest chapter of the saga, a court ruled that America's sanctions authority, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), does not have the authority to sanction a certain type of smart contract, or string of autonomous code, that undergirds Tornado Cash: its so-called immutable contracts.

Recall that in August 2022, OFAC sanctioned Tornado Cash, which accepts traceable crypto from users and returns it in untraceable format. Tornado had been used by the sanctioned North Korean hacker group Lazarus to obfuscate its financial tracks. OFAC listed Tornado Cash's website tornado.cash along with 53 Ethereum addresses.

The sanctions were relatively effective. Americans could no longer use the bot without risking fines or imprisonment. Those who had funds deposited in Tornado had to ask OFAC for special permission to withdraw them. In the months after the sanctions were announced, usage of the privacy bot plunged and the amount of crypto deposited fell by over half.
 
After two different sets of plaintiffs challenged OFAC's actions in court, the appeals court in one of the cases returned a verdict last week. An immutable smart contract is "unownable, uncontrollable, and unchangeable—even by its creators," and therefore it doesn't qualify as property. Because OFAC's sanctioning power is limited to that which is property, it follows that OFAC cannot sanction immutable smart contracts.

This not-property ruling only applies to twenty immutable Tornado Cash contracts that were on OFAC's sanctions list. Tornado's mutable contracts, those that can be controlled and changed, remain property—and thus can stay on the list of sanctioned contracts. Unless OFAC wins on appeal, it will presumably have to unsanction those twenty immutable contracts.

Now, it's possible that as long as the remaining sanctioned mutable contracts are crucial to the functioning of the Tornado Cash bot, the revised sanctions blacklist will still have an effect. And if OFAC adds other key mutable Tornado Cash smart contracts to its list (say like the contracts allowing governance, which for some reason were not originally sanctioned), American users will continue to steer clear of Tornado Cash, the bot's anonymizing capacities remaining lower than otherwise, thus diminishing its ability to serve North Korean interests. 

But if not, what can OFAC do? 

Sanction users, not code

I've already done a bit of digging on this question. In response to the sanctions, I wrote an article in late 2022 entitled: How to stop illegal activity on Tornado Cash (without using sanctions) The gist was to explore alternative tools for countering illicit activity on Tornado rather than the blunt tool of sanctioning its actual smart contracts. What I suggested was to apply pressure to the users of the smart contracts. "Rather than punishing code, penalize the people who use the code."

The logic goes like this. Any user who deposits crypto to Tornado Cash, even someone with clean crypto, is providing North Korea with prohibited financial services, the Tornado bot being the means by which the two sides are connecting as counterparties. Whether intentional or not, a user's deposits broaden the anonymity set of Tornado Cash, or its ability to obfuscate larger amounts of illicit funds sourced from sanctioned counterparties like Lazarus.

Think of it as sanctioned North Korean users passing on sanctions taint to all other Tornado Cash users by virtue of everyone interacting via the same bot, Tornado Cash. This taint spreads to those who deposited their crypto (clean or dirty) to Tornado at the same time as Lazarus and/or those who have continued to deposit to it in light of the known fact that the North Korean group regularly deposits stolen funds to the platform.

OFAC issues a public alert stating that any foreigner can and will be sanctioned if their funds interact with North Korean funds on Tornado Cash. In response, some foreign users will risk being designated and continue to engage with Tornado. Many will not. As for U.S. users, OFAC can threaten them with potential civil monetary penalties if they aid North Korea using Tornado as their a tool. A $10,000 fine for interacting with sanctioned North Korean actors via the Tornado Cash bot will probably discourage most usage.

Another core set of Tornado Cash users who OFAC has legal leverage over are the relayers—real life individuals who provide an extra layer of privacy to Tornado Cash users. (I explain here why relayers are necessary for full privacy). OFAC can threaten foreign relayers with sanctions and U.S.-based relayers with civil monetary penalties.

Pressuring these various groups of users won't stop Tornado Cash code from functioning, but it will certainly constrain the activity it facilitates, and thus make it harder for North Korea to anonymize its funds. And it is consistent with the court's not-property ruling because users, not contracts, are being targeted.

I'm not saying that OFAC will follow this playbook, or that it should, but it certainly is an option. There is another route, though, and that is to go to Congress and ask for the ability to put sanctions on immutable entities. 

More broadly, Tornado Cash may just be the first in an emerging population of unownable and uncontrollable techno-beings—bots, machines, drones, androids, AI agents,  automatons, and golems—that operate independently of human control, many of which will end up doing very dangerous things. Society may want the legal ability to protect its members from these immutable contraptions, including by sanctioning them.

For instance, imagine the following scenario...

A Russian AI-guided assassin bot

If a Russian assassin is regularly poisoning people (including U.S. citizens) for criticizing Putin, OFAC can sanction that assassin, thus preventing any American entity from dealing with him and blocking all of his accounts, his car, and his interests in various companies. That might not stop the assassin, but it'll make his job more difficult. In doing so, OFAC is simply fulfilling its mandate to use its sanctioning powers to protect Americans.

Say the assassin creates an artificial intelligence and imbues it with all of his assassin's lore, providing it with an artificial body and then throwing away the keys, rendering the robot immutable. The court's recent not-property ruling suggests that while OFAC can ably defend Americans from the flesh and blood assassin, it cannot protect them from the assassin's immutable killing robot—even though the robot performs the precise same killing function as the living assassin using the exact same techniques.

This is obviously an incongruity, one that seems like it should be fixed. Or is there a specific reason why we should provide legal safe harbor to all unownable and uncontrollable techno-beings? Feel free to explain in the comments.

In any case, OFAC's efforts to apply its national security mandate to Tornado Cash are probably not over. Let's see how it responds. Some sort of resolution is important because we are still in the early stages of being inundated with self-guided autonomous agents.